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Stable fractional matchings
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We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as
opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal
setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal
is to understand the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) or nearly-
optimal stable fractional matching. We present simple approximation algorithms for this problem with weak
welfare guarantees and, rather unexpectedly, we furthermore show that achieving better approximations is
hard. This computational hardness persists even for approximate stability. To the best of our knowledge, these
are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings. En route to these results, we
provide a number of structural observations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The stable matching problem [15] is one of the most extensively studied problems at the interface
of economics and computer science, with notable practical applications such as matching students
to schools [1], medical graduates to hospitals [29], and organ donors to patients [31]. The input to
the problem consists of the preference lists of two sets of agents, commonly referred to as themen
and the women. The goal is to find a stable matching, i.e., a matching in which no pair of man and
woman prefer each other over their assigned partners.
The standard formulation of the stable matching problem involves two key assumptions: First,
that the matching is integral (i.e., two agents are either completely matched or completely un-
matched), and second, that agents have ordinal preferences (typically in the form of rank-ordered
lists). Although these assumptions suffice in a number of applications (including those mentioned
above), there are natural examples where they turn out to be inadequate. For instance, time-sharing
applications [30] naturally give rise to fractional matchings: Imagine a scenario where a set of
newly hired employees are matched with a set of supervisors. Assuming that each individual can
spend one unit of time at work, an integral matching prescribes that every employee should work
full-time with a single supervisor. On the other hand, fractional matchings allow the employees
to divide their time in working with multiple supervisors, making them a more natural modeling
choice in such situations.
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Fig. 1. Instance with
cardinal preferences.
Likewise, ordinal preferences, despite their simplicity and ease of elici-
tation, can often be quite restrictive. Indeed, in many real-world matching
applications (e.g., labor markets), the outcomes experienced by the partic-
ipants are inherently cardinal in nature (e.g., wages). In such settings, it is
decidedly more natural to model the intensity of preferences, as has been
noted in theory [3, 28] as well as lab experiments [12]. Encouraged by these
insights, and the fact that cardinal utilities provide a clean and unambigu-
ous way of comparing matching outcomes in terms of their social welfare,
we consider a generalization of the stable matching model that allows for
fractional matchings (as opposed to integral) and cardinal preferences (as
opposed to ordinal).
More concretely, we consider a setting where the preferences are specified in terms of valuations
(e.g., in the matching instance in Figure 1,m1 values w1 at 0 and w1 valuesm1 at 3). A fractional
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matching is simply a convex combination of integral matchings, and an agent’s utility under a
fractional matching is the appropriately weighted sum of its utilities under the constituent integral
matchings. A fractional matching µ is stable if no pair of man and woman simultaneously derive
greater utility in being integrally matched to each other than they do under µ .
The above generalization has a clear merit in terms of social welfare: Stable solutions under the
generalized model can have greater welfare than those under the standard model as the following
example illustrates.
Example 1. Consider the instance in Figure 1 with three menm1,m2, m3 and three women w1,
w2, w3. Among the six possible integral matchings, only µ1 ≔ {(m1,w3), (m2,w2), (m3,w1)} and
µ2 ≔ {(m1,w1), (m2,w3), (m3,w2)} are stable. Indeed, µ1 and µ2 are themen-proposing andwomen-
proposing Gale-Shapley matchings respectively [15]. The social welfare (i.e., sum of utilities of all
agents) under these matchings isW(µ1) =W(µ2) = 7.
Define µ3 ≔ {(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)}, and notice thatW(µ3) = 8. Now consider a fractional
matching µ ≔ 12 µ2 +
1
2µ3. The social welfare of µ is W(µ) =
1
2W(µ2) +
1
2W(µ3) = 15/2 > 7 =
W(µ1) =W(µ2), i.e., µ has a higher social welfare than any stable integral matching. Importantly,
µ is a stable fractional matching. Indeed, under µ , the utilities ofm1,m2,m3, w1, w2, and w3 are 0,
1/2, 3/2, 3, 3/2, and 1 respectively. Thus, for every man-woman pair, at least one of the two agents
meets the corresponding utility threshold for that pair, implying that µ is stable.
Overall, the instance in Figure 1 admits a stable fractional matching with strictly greater welfare
than any stable integral matching. 
Starting with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [15], there is now an extensive literature on
algorithms for computing stable solutions, including ones that optimize a variety of objectives per-
taining to fairness and economic efficiency [16, 19, 23, 27, 34]. Most of these algorithms, however,
are tailored to compute stable integral matchings. As Example 1 demonstrates, such algorithms
could, in general, return highly suboptimal outcomes in our setting. Therefore, it becomes perti-
nent to understand the computational complexity of finding an “optimal” stable matching in the
generalized model. Our work studies this question from the lens of the fundamental objective of
social welfare, and asks the following natural question:
Can we efficiently compute an optimal or nearly optimal stable fractional matching?
1.1 Our results and roadmap
We formalize this question by defining the optimization problem Optimal Stable Fractional
Matching. We demonstrate its importance by strengthening the observation in Example 1 and
showing that the social welfare gap between the best stable fractional and best stable integral
matchings can be arbitrarily large. We then mitigate this very positive message by identifying im-
portant characteristics of optimal and nearly-optimal stable fractional matchings. These include a
non-convexity property and, more crucially, necessary conditions requiring that such matchings
are formed by convex combinations of many unstable integral matchings. This already narrows
down the range of tools we can use for the design of efficient (approximation) algorithms. Still,
we present simple algorithms for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching with an approxima-
tion ratio of 1 + σmax/σmin, where σmax and σmin represent the maximum and minimum positive
valuation in the input instance. For the variant Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching, where
the stability constraints are relaxed by an ε factor, an embarrassingly simple algorithm computes
1/ε-approximate solutions. Rather unexpectedly, we show that these approximation guarantees
are almost best possible by polynomial-time algorithms (unless P = NP). To the best of our knowl-
edge, these are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present related work in the matching liter-
ature in Section 1.2. We continue in Section 2 with preliminary definitions and warm up with
exponential-time algorithms that solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching using linear pro-
gramming. Structural properties of optimal and nearly-optimal solutions toOptimal Stable Frac-
tional Matching are presented in Section 3. Our algorithms are presented in Section 4. Our in-
approximability results are stated and partially proved in Section 5. Some proofs and additional
material appear in appendix.
1.2 Further related work
The stable marriage problem has been extensively studied over the years [15, 17, 26, 32] with
several interesting results in the original model of [15] as well as several of its variants [8, 18, 20,
22, 27]. While the Gale-Shapley algorithm can find a stable matching in polynomial time, several
of these variants are computationally more challenging [27]; we refer the interested reader to the
survey of Iwama and Miyazaki [21] for a more detailed exposition. Starting with the works of
Vande Vate [35], Rothblum [33], and Roth et al. [30], there is by now a well-developed literature
on the linear programming formulations of the stable matching problem [34, 36], and various
combinatorial algorithms that optimize fairness-related objectives are also known [7, 14, 16, 19, 23].
However, the majority of this work studies integral stable matchings under ordinal preferences.
The theoretical and practical importance of modeling agents’ cardinal preferences in stable
matching settings has been highlighted, among others, by Anshelevich et al. [4] and Pini et al.
[28]. Anshelevich et al. [4] formulate the notions of exact/approximate stability in terms of cardi-
nal preferences that are central to our work; see Definition 1. They study the “price of anarchy” for
stable matchings (defined as the ratio of social welfare of the optimal matching and the worst sta-
ble integral matching) under various preference structures as well as its extensions to approximate
stability. A similar approach has been adopted in related settings [2, 13]. Pini et al. [28] consider a
notion of stability similar to [4], but focus on achieving economic efficiency (in particular, Pareto
optimality and its variants) along with stability. They also study strategic aspects which are an
exciting avenue for future research even in our model.
In terms of computing efficient (i.e., welfare-maximizing or cost-minimizing) stable matchings,
Irving et al. [19], Manlove et al. [27], andMai and Vazirani [24] provide efficient algorithms and/or
inapproximability results, but crucially, these results apply to integral matchings only. To the best
of our knowledge, the computational questions associated with computing stable fractional match-
ings have not been considered prior to this work.
Deligkas et al. [9] study matchings computed by the natural greedy algorithm in edge-weighted
graphs. Among other results, they show that the problem of computing the maximum-weight
greedy matching in a bipartite graph is NP-hard. The greedy matchings in their model are stable
integral matchings in ours. Still, as we discuss in Appendix A.2, this result implies the NP-hardness
of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. We note that our inapproximability results are much
stronger.
Our definition of fractional stability (in the presence of cardinal preferences) has appeared before
in the economics literature [5, 10, 11, 25]. However, these papers focus primarily on the relationship
among various notions of stability and economic efficiency, and do not consider computational
questions. We remark here that the term “fractional stability” has been overloaded in the related
literature, as it has also been used to refer to fractional matchings that only have integral stable
matchings in their support [34]; note that stability in the latter context can be defined purely in
terms of the ordinal preferences. This notion of “ex-post” stability is fundamentally different from
ours, as it is precisely the existence of unstable integral matchings in the support of the stable
fractional matching (see Proposition 3) that allows for the large gain in welfare in Example 1 and
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Theorem 1. If one is interested in the ex-post notion of stability, then the computational problem
clearly reduces to the case of integral matchings.
2 PRELIMINARIES
An instance of Stable Matching problem with Cardinal preferences (SMC) is given by the tuple
〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉, where M ≔ {m1, . . . ,mn} and W ≔ {w1, . . . ,wn} denote the set of n men and
n women, respectively, andU andV are n×nmatrices of non-negative rational numbers that spec-
ify the valuations of the agents. Specifically,U (m,w) is the value derived by manm from his match
with womanw , andV (m,w) is the value derived bywomanw from hermatchwithmanm. Many of
our results will focus on two special classes of valuations, namely binary (whereU ,V ∈ {0, 1}n×n)
and ternary valuations (whereU ,V ∈ {0, 1,α}n×n for some α > 1).
Wewill often describe an SMC instance using its graph representation. An instanceI = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉
can be represented as a bipartite graph with vertex sets M and W , and an edge for every pair
(m,w) ∈ M ×W such that at least one of U (m,w) > 0 or V (m,w) > 0 holds. Each edge (m,w) in
this graph has two valuations associated with it, namelyU (m,w) and V (m,w).
A fractional matching µ : M ×W → R≥0 is an assignment of non-negative weights to all man-
woman pairs such that
∑
w ∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 for eachm ∈ M and
∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 for eachw ∈W .
A fractional matching µ is said to be complete if
∑
w ∈W µ(m,w) = 1 for each man m ∈ M and∑
m∈M µ(m,w) = 1 for each woman w ∈W . An integral matching µ is a fractional matching with
weights µ(m,w) ∈ {0, 1} for every pair (m,w). With slight abuse of notation, we sometimes view
an integral matching µ as a set of pairs and write (m,w) ∈ µ instead of µ(m,w) = 1.
It is well-known, and follows from the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) theorem, that a fractional
matching µ can be decomposed into a convex combination of k = O(n2) integral matchings
µ(1), µ(2), . . . , µ(k) so that for every pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , we have
µ(m,w) =
∑k
j=1 λj · µ
(j)(m,w),
where λj > 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} and
∑k
j=1 λj = 1. The set of integral matchings {µ
(1), . . . , µ(k)}
is called the support of the fractional matching µ . Note that the support need not be unique.
We proceed with the formal definitions of stability and approximate stability, which in turn use
the definition of the utility derived by agents under a fractional matching. In particular, the utility
derived by the manm under µ is given by um(µ) ≔
∑
w ∈W U (m,w)µ(m,w), and the utility derived
by the womanw is given by vw (µ) ≔
∑
m∈M V (m,w)µ(m,w).
Definition 1 (Stability). Given a fractional matching µ , a man-woman pair (m,w) is said to be a
blocking pair if um(µ) < U (m,w) and vw (µ) < V (m,w). A fractional matching µ is stable if there
are no blocking pairs, i.e., for each (m,w) ∈ M ×W , either um(µ) ≥ U (m,w) or vw (µ) ≥ V (m,w).
Definition 2 (ε-Stability). Given any ε ∈ [0, 1) and a fractional matching µ , a man-woman pair
(m,w) is said to be ε-blocking if um(µ) < (1 − ε)U (m,w) and vw (µ) < (1 − ε)V (m,w); otherwise,
the pair is said to be ε-stable. A fractional matching µ is ε-stable if all pairs are ε-stable.
A stable fractional matching is also ε-stable for every ε ≥ 0. The next statement follows from
the seminal result of Gale and Shapley [15].
Proposition 1. Given any SMC instance I, a stable fractional matching µ for I always exists
and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 1 was originally proven in [15] in the standard stable matching model with ordinal
preferences and integral matchings. It is easy to see that given any SMC instance I, if an integral
matching µ is stable for an ordinal instance derived from I (where the ordinal preferences of each
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agent are consistent with its valuations, breaking ties arbitrarily), then it is also stable for the
original instance I.
Next, we define social welfare, which is a measure of the efficiency of a fractional matching.
Definition 3 (Social welfare). Given an SMC instance 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 and a fractional matching
µ , the social welfare of µ is defined as
W(µ) ≔
∑
m∈M um(µ) +
∑
w ∈W vw (µ) =
∑
m∈M
∑
w ∈W (U (m,w) +V (m,w))µ(m,w).
An optimal matching is one with the highest social welfare among all fractional matchings. It
follows from the BvN decomposition that there is always an integral optimal matching. Similarly,
an optimal stable fractional matching (respectively, optimal ε-stable fractional matching) is one
with the highest social welfare among all stable (respectively, all ε-stable) fractional matchings.We
will use Optimal Stable Fractional Matching and Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching
to refer to the corresponding optimization problems. For ρ ∈ (0, 1], the term ρ-efficient refers to
a stable (respectively, ε-stable) fractional matching with welfare at least ρ times the welfare of
the optimal stable (respectively, ε-stable) fractional matching. Thus, an optimal stable (or ε-stable)
fractional matching is 1-efficient.
2.1 Computing optimal stable fractional matchings
Wewill now discuss two exponential-time algorithms forOptimal Stable FractionalMatching.
The first algorithm uses the following mixed integer linear program (OPT-Stab):
(OPT-Stab) maximize
∑
m∈M um +
∑
w ∈W vw
subject to um ≥ U (m,w)y(m,w) ∀m ∈ M ,w ∈W (1)
vw ≥ V (m,w)(1 − y(m,w)) ∀m ∈ M ,w ∈W (2)
um =
∑
w ∈W U (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀m ∈ M (3)
vw =
∑
m∈M V (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀w ∈W (4)∑
w ∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀m ∈ M (5)∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀w ∈W (6)
µ(m,w) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ M ,w ∈W (7)
y(m,w) ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈ M ,w ∈W (8)
The non-negative weights µ(m,w) of man-woman pairs as well as the utilities um ≔ um(µ) and
vw ≔ vw (µ) of the agents (set in equalities (3) and (4)) are the fractional variables of (OPT-Stab).
The binary variables y(m,w) encode the stability requirements for pair (m,w) in constraints (1)
and (2). Indeed, by setting y(m,w) to 1 or 0, we can require either um(µ) ≥ U (m,w) or vw (µ) ≥
V (m,w). Constraints (5) and (6) ensure feasibility. By enumerating over all possible combinations
of values for the binary variablesy(m,w) for (m,w) ∈ M ×W , we get 2n
2
different linear programs,
and, clearly, at least one of them must have the optimal stable fractional matching as its optimal
solution.
Our second algorithm is slightly faster and solves at most O(nn) linear programs. It exploits
the following linear program (OPT-Thresh), which is defined using non-negative constants θm for
m ∈ M and θw forw ∈W , which we call utility thresholds.
(OPT-Thresh) maximize
∑
m∈M um +
∑
w ∈W vw
subject to um ≥ θm ∀m ∈ M (9)
vw ≥ θw ∀w ∈W (10)
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um =
∑
w ∈W U (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀m ∈ M (11)
vw =
∑
m∈M V (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀w ∈W (12)∑
w ∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀m ∈ M (13)∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀w ∈W (14)
µ(m,w) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ M ,w ∈W (15)
When all utility thresholds are set to zero, the solution of (OPT-Thresh) is an optimal (i.e.,
welfare-maximizing) fractional matching. Using (OPT-Thresh) to maximize social welfare under
stability constraints is more challenging.We say that a set of utility thresholds is stability-preserving
if for every pair of agentsm ∈ M and w ∈ W , either θm ≥ U (m,w) or θw ≥ V (m,w). Then, any
fractional matching µ that is feasible for (OPT-Stab) is also feasible for (OPT-Thresh) for some
stability-preserving set of utility thresholds. Conversely, any fractional matching µ that is feasi-
ble for (OPT-Thresh) with some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds is also feasible for
(OPT-Stab). Therefore, in order to solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching, it suffices to
enumerate all O(nn) sets of utility thresholds with θm ∈ {U (m,w) : w ∈W } for every manm ∈ M ,
compute utility thresholds θw ∈ {V (m,w) : m ∈ M} for all w ∈ W so that the utility thresholds
are stability-preserving, and solve (OPT-Thresh). Among these solutions, the fractional matching
with highest social welfare will be the solution of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching.
3 STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
In this section, we present several observations about the structure of optimal and nearly-optimal
stable fractional matchings.We begin by considerably strengthening our observation in Example 1
regarding the welfare gap between stable fractional and stable integral matchings.
Theorem 1. For every δ > 0 and α ≥ 2, there exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations
in {0, 1,α} and an optimal stable fractional matching µ∗ such that any stable integral matching µs
satisfies W(µs ) ≤
(
α − 12 − δ
)−1
W(µ∗).
We emphasize that Theorem 1 is a positive result as it establishes that stable fractional matchings
can have much higher welfare than their integral counterparts, and highlights the importance of
Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Appendix A.1.
Our next observation (Proposition 2) shows that the set of stable fractionalmatchings can be non-
convex even for binary valuations. Interestingly, this does not prevent us from efficiently solving
Optimal Stable Fractional Matching in this setting (see Theorem 4 in Section 4).
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Fig. 2. The SMC instances used in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2. There exists an SMC instance with binary valuations for which the set of stable
fractional matchings is non-convex.
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Proof. Consider the instance I = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 with three menm1,m2,m3 and three women
w1,w2,w3, whose graph representation and agent valuations are shown in Figure 2a. Consider the
integral matchings µ(1) ≔ {(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)} and µ(2) ≔ {(m1,w2), (m2,w3), (m3,w1)}.
It is easy to verify that both µ(1) and µ(2) are stable for I. However, the fractional matching µ ≔
0.5µ(1)+0.5µ(2) is not stable since (m2,w2) is a blocking pair; indeed, 0.5 = um2(µ) < U (m2,w2) = 1
and 0.5 = vw2(µ) < V (m2,w2) = 1. 
The structure of stable fractional matchings becomesmuchmore interesting (and, as we will see
in Section 5, also computationally unwieldy) when we move to ternary valuations. It turns out that
the support of a stable fractional matching can comprise entirely of unstable integral matchings
(Proposition 3), and its size can grow linearly with the input (Theorem 3). These observations pose
major limitations on the set of algorithmic tools at our disposal.
Proposition 3. There exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations and a stable fractional
matching µ such that every integral matching in any support of µ is unstable.
Proof. Consider the SMC instance I = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 with three men and three women shown
in Figure 2b. The parameter α ≥ 3 is a constant. There are six different perfect integral matchings:
• Matching µ(1), which consists of pairs (m1,w1), (m2,w2), and (m3,w3) and has a social welfare
of 6. It is easy to verify that this is the unique stable integral matching. Also, any subset of
µ(1) is not stable as the pair that is missing from µ(1) will be blocking.
• Matching µ(2), which consists of pairs (m1,w2), (m2,w3), and (m3,w1) and has a social welfare
of 2α . The matching is not stable since the pair (m1,w1) is blocking.
• Matching µ(3), which consists of pairs (m1,w3), (m2,w1), and (m3,w2) and has a social welfare
of 2α . It is not stable since (m2,w2) is blocking.
• Matching µ(4), which consists of pairs (m1,w1), (m2,w3), and (m3,w2) and has a social welfare
of α + 2. It is not stable since (m3,w3) is blocking.
• Matching µ(5), which consists of pairs (m1,w3), (m2,w2), and (m3,w1) and has a social welfare
of 2α + 2. It is not stable since (m1,w1) is blocking.
• Matching µ(6), which consists of pairs (m1,w2), (m2,w1), and (m3,w3) and has a social welfare
of α + 2. It is not stable since the pair (m2,w2) is blocking.
Consider the matching µ ≔ 1
α (α−1) · µ
(2)
+
1
α
· µ(3) + α−2
α−1 · µ
(5). It is easy to verify that µ is stable.
Indeed, the utilities of the agents under µ are given by um1 (µ) = 0, um2(µ) = 1, um3 (µ) = α − 1,
vw1(µ) = 1, vw2(µ) =
α−2
α−1 and vw3(µ) = α −
1
α−1 . Notice that only the pairs (m1,w1), (m2,w2),
and (m3,w3) need to be checked for stability, since any other pair has at least one agent with a
valuation of zero (and, hence, the stability constraint for those pairs is trivially satisfied). For each
of the pairs (m1,w1), (m2,w2), and (m3,w3), there is some member of the pair that has a utility of
at least 1 under µ , which meets the requisite stability threshold, implying that µ is stable. Finally,
notice that µ(m1,w1) = 0, which means that the unique stable integral matching µ(1) cannot occur
in a support of µ . 
We remark that with some extra work, one can show that the matching µ in the proof of Propo-
sition 3 is the unique optimal stable fractional matching.
As mentioned previously in Section 2, a (stable) fractional matching is the convex combination
of at most n2 integral ones. Theorem 2 provides a stronger bound on the support size of an optimal
stable fractional matching.
Theorem 2. Given any SMC instance I, there exists an optimal stable fractional matching for I
with at most 4n integral matchings in its support.
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Proof. Let µ∗ be an optimal stable fractional matching for I. Recall from Section 2.1 that µ∗
solves the program (OPT-Thresh) for some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds. Observe
that (OPT-Thresh) has n2 free variables (we ignore here the 2n variables um form ∈ M and vw for
w ∈W , which depend on the remaining ones according to constraints (11) and (12)). Without loss
of generality, µ∗ is an optimal extreme point solution of (OPT-Thresh). That is, when (OPT-Thresh)
is instantiated for µ∗, n2 linearly independent inequality constraints become tight. Among them, at
most 4n can correspond to the sets of constraints (9), (10), (13), and (14). The remaining ones must
correspond to the set of constraints (15), implying that at least n2 − 4n free variables will be equal
to zero. Thus, µ∗ can assign positive weights to at most 4n man-woman pairs and, consequently,
can have at most 4n integral matchings in its support. 
Next we show that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight up to a constant factor.
Theorem 3. For every ρ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a family of SMC instances with ternary valuations
for which any support of a ρ-efficient stable fractional matching consists of Ω(ρn) integral matchings.
Proof. Consider a family of SMC instances In = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 with M = {m1, . . . ,mn} and
W = {w1, . . . ,wn}, where n is odd. Let α be such that α > max
{
n + 2, 2n
ρ (n−1)
}
. The (ternary) valu-
ations of the agents are defined as follows: For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}, U (mi ,wi ) = V (mi ,wi ) = 1.
For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−12 }, U (m2i ,w1) = U (m2i+1,w2i ) = V (m2i ,w2i+1) = α and V (m2i ,w1) =
V (m2i+1,w2i ) = U (m2i ,w2i+1) = 0. Finally, U (mn,w1) = 0 and V (mn,w1) = α . For all remaining
pairs (m,w) ∈ M ×W ,U (m,w) = V (m,w) = 0. Figure 3a illustrates the SMC instance I5.
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1 1
0
αα
0
1 1
α
0
1 1
0
α
0
α
α
0
1 1
(a)
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
(b)
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
(c)
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
(d)
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
(e)
Fig. 3. Subfigure (a) illustrates the graph representation of the SMC instance In described in the
proof of Theorem 3 for n = 5. Subfigure (b) shows the matching µopt. Subfigures (c), (d), and (e) show
the matchings µ(1), µ(2), and µ(3), respectively. Dashed lines indicate zero-valuation pairs that do not
appear in the graph representation.
Define µopt ≔ {(m1,w1)} ∪
{
(m2i ,w2i+1), (m2i+1,w2i ) : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
n−1
2 }
}
(see Figure 3b). We
also define a number of other integral matchings obtained by modifying µopt, as follows: For i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n−12 }, the matching µ
(i ) (see Figures 3c and 3d) is the integral matching which is obtained
from µopt by replacing {(m1,w1), (m2i ,w2i+1)} with {(m1,w2i+1), (m2i ,w1)}, i.e.,
µ(i ) ≔ (m1,w2i+1) ∪ (m2i ,w1) ∪ (m2i+1,w2i ) ∪ {(m2ℓ,w2ℓ+1) ∪ (m2ℓ+1,w2ℓ)}ℓ∈{1,2, ..., n−1
2
}\{i } .
Also, the matching µ(
n+1
2 ) (see Figure 3e) is the integral matching obtained from µopt by replacing
{(m1,w1), (mn,wn−1)} with {(m1,wn−1), (mn,w1)}, i.e.,
µ(
n+1
2 ) ≔ (m1,wn−1) ∪ (mn−1,wn) ∪ (mn,w1) ∪ {(m2ℓ,w2ℓ+1) ∪ (m2ℓ+1,w2ℓ)}ℓ∈{1,2, ..., n−3
2
} .
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Now, consider the fractional matching µ ≔
∑ n+1
2
i=1
1
α
µ(i ) +
(
1 − n+12α
)
µopt. Since α > n + 2 > n+12 ,
µ is well-defined and has the matchings µopt and µ(i ) for i ∈
{
1, . . . , n+12
}
in its support. Notice that
W(µopt) = (n − 1)α + 2 andW(µ(i )) = (n − 1)α for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+12 }. Thus,W(µ) > (n − 1)α .
It can be verified that µ is stable. Indeed, we only need to check the blocking condition for
the pairs (mi ,wi ) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. We have that vw1(µ) ≥ 1 (since µ
( n+1
2
) has weight 1
α
in
µ and V (mn,w1) = α ), um2i (µ) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
n−1
2 } (since µ
(i ) has weight 1α in µ and
U (m2i ,w1) = α ), and vw2i+1(µ) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
n−1
2 } (since µ
(i ) has weight 1
α
in µ and
V (m2i ,w2i+1) = α ). The welfare of the optimal stable fractional matching must therefore be at least
W(µ), and thus strictly greater than (n − 1)α .
We now claim that any ρ-efficient stable fractional matching µ ′ satisfies µ ′(mn,w1) > 0. Indeed,
assuming otherwise that µ ′(mn,w1) = 0, the only pair that can give positive utility to manm1 and
woman w1 is (m1,w1). Hence, we must also have µ ′(m1,w1) = 1, and, as a result, µ ′(m2i ,w1) = 0
for i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , n−12
}
. Then, the only pair that can give positive utility to manm2i and woman
w2i is (m2i ,w2i ), and hence, it must also be that µ ′(m2i ,w2i ) = 1. Consequently, the only pair that
can give positive utility to manm2i+1 and womanw2i+1 is (m2i+1,w2i+1) and, hence, we must have
µ ′(m2i+1,w2i+1) = 1. The welfare of matching µ ′ would then be 2n, which is less than ρ(n − 1)α by
the assumed bound on α . In other words, the welfare of µ ′ would be less than ρ times the welfare
of the stable fractional matching µ , contradicting the assumption that µ ′ is ρ-efficient.
The final step in the proof involves showing that for any stable fractional matching µ ′ with
support of size at most n−12 ρ, we must haveW(µ
′) < ρ(n − 1)α ; the desired bound on the support
size would then follow from the contrapositive. LetT ≔
{
i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . n−12
}
: µ ′(m2i ,w1) > 0
}
, and
T ≔
{
1, 2, . . . n−12
}
\T . Since µ ′ has support of size at most n−12 ρ and µ
′(mn,w1) > 0, it holds that
|T | ≤ n−12 ρ − 1.
For every i ∈ T , the agents m2i , w2i , m2i+1, and w2i+1 can together contribute at most 2α to
the welfare. On the other hand, when i ∈ T , we have µ ′(m2i ,w1) = 0, and the only pair that
can give positive utility to man m2i and woman w2i is (m2i ,w2i ). Therefore, we must have that
µ ′(m2i ,w2i ) = 1. Consequently, the only pair that can give positive utility tomanm2i+1 andwoman
w2i+1 is (m2i+1,w2i+1), and it follows that µ ′(m2i+1,w2i+1) = 1. Therefore, when i ∈ T , the agents
m2i , w2i , m2i+1, and w2i+1 can together contribute at most 4 to the welfare. Taking the possible
contribution of pair (m1,w1) into account, we have that
W(µ ′) ≤ 2 + 2α |T | + 4|T | = 2n + (2α − 4)|T | ≤ 2n + ρ(n − 1)α − 2α − 2(n − 1)ρ + 4 < ρ(n − 1)α .
The equality follows from the definition ofT , the second inequality follows from the bound on |T |
above, and the third one from the definition of α . This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3 has an interesting algorithmic implication. As the support size can be large in any
good approximation of the optimal stable fractional matching, it implies that support enumeration
strategies—which have been proved useful in other contexts; see [6] and the references therein—
will be ineffective in computing (even approximate) solutions of Optimal Stable Fractional
Matching. A similar implication can be shown for optimal ε-stable fractional matchings. In con-
trast, as we will show in Section 4, ε-stable fractional matchings of small support can be easily
computed, and provide nearly the best approximation ratios achievable by efficient algorithms
(under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions).
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4 ALGORITHMIC RESULTS
We begin the discussion of our algorithmic results with binary valuations. In this setting, Optimal
Stable Fractional Matching reduces to computing a maximum weight matching on a specific
weighted graph associated with the given instance.
Theorem 4. Given an SMC instance I = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 with binary valuations, an optimal stable
fractional matching for I can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let G be the graph representation of I. We assign to each edge (m,w) in G a weight
γ (m,w), as follows: γ (m,w) = 2 + 1/n2 whenever U (m,w) = V (m,w) = 1, otherwise γ (m,w) = 1.
Thus, for any matching µ in G , if nµ denotes the number of agents (men and women) with utility
1 in the SMC instance I, then nµ ≤
∑
(m,w )∈µ γ (m,w) < nµ + 1.
Let µ be a maximum weight matching in G . Note that µ can be computed in polynomial time.
Also, it follows from the above inequality that µ is an optimal matching for I. We will now argue
that µ is stable. Indeed, assuming otherwise, any blocking pair (m,w) must have 0 = um(µ) <
U (m,w) = 1, 0 = vw (µ) < V (m,w) = 1 and (m,w) < µ . Thus, if µ contains one or both of the edges
(m,w ′) and (m′,w) for some w ′ , w and m′ , m, then we must have that U (m,w ′) = 0 and/or
V (m′,w) = 0. By our definition of weights, this would imply that γ (m,w ′) = 1 and/or γ (m′,w) = 1.
We can now replace one or both of these edges with the edge (m,w), which has weight γ (m,w) =
2 + 1/n2, and obtain a new matching with strictly larger weight—a contradiction. 
Next, we consider general valuations and show how to exploit stable integral matchings to get
an approximate solution for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Let σmax and σmin denote
the largest and the smallest non-zero valuation among all agents in I, respectively. We call a man-
woman pair (m,w) light if eitherU (m,w) = 0 orV (m,w) = 0, and heavy otherwise. Given an SMC
instance I as input, our algorithm computes a stable integral matching for I, say µ , in two steps:
First, it computes a stable integral matching µ1 using only the heavy pairs (and taking into account
the stability constraints in heavy pairs only). Then, it completes the solution with a matching µ2 of
maximum welfare using the light pairs subject to feasibility constraints, i.e., using light pairs that
do not share any agents with the pairs in µ1. The light pairs impose no additional constraints on
stability, so the resulting matching is stable.
We will show that µ has approximation ratio 1+σmax/σmin. Let µopt be an optimal matching for
I. Also, let µopt1 be the set of pairs of µ
opt that share an agent with some pair of µ1, i.e., µ
opt
1 ≔
{(m,w) ∈ µopt : at least one ofm orw is matched under µ1}. By definition of µ2, we haveW(µ2) ≥
W(µopt \ µ
opt
1 ). To complete the proof, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. W(µ1 \ µ
opt
1 ) ≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1W(µ
opt
1 \ µ1).
Proof. Our proof constructs a mapping in which every pair (m,w) ∈ µ
opt
1 \ µ1 is mapped to one
of its agents, whom we will call the witness of the pair. The mapping is such that the utility of the
witness in the matching µ1 \ µ
opt
1 is at least (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1 (U (m,w) +V (m,w)). Note that once
we establish the said mapping, the proof will follow, since each agent can be the witness of at most
one pair of µopt1 \ µ1 andW(µ1 \ µ
opt
1 ) is at least the total utility of the witnesses in µ1 \ µ
opt
1 .
Consider a light pair (m,w) ∈ µopt1 \ µ1. The witness is an agent (m or w) who also belongs
to a pair of µ1 \ µ
opt
1 ; such an agent certainly exists by the definition of µ
opt
1 . Since all pairs of
µ1 \ µ
opt
1 are heavy, the utility of the witness of (m,w) in µ1 \ µ
opt
1 is at least σmin =
σmin
σmax
(0+σmax) ≥
(1 + σmax/σmin)
−1 (U (m,w) +V (m,w)), since (m,w) is light.
Now consider a heavy pair (m,w) ∈ µ
opt
1 \ µ1. If µ1 contains a pair (m,w
′) with U (m,w ′) ≥
U (m,w), select agent m to be the witness, otherwise select agent w . Note that in the latter case,
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stability of µ1 implies the existence of (m′,w) ∈ µ1 such thatV (m′,w) ≥ V (m,w). Hence, the utility
of the witness of (m,w) in µ1 \ µ
opt
1 is at least min{U (m,w),V (m,w)}, which, in turn, is at least
(1 + σmax/σmin)
−1 (U (m,w) +V (m,w)). 
Now, Lemma 1 gives the desired approximation ratio, as follows:
W(µ) =W(µ1) +W(µ2) =W(µ1 \ µ
opt
1 ) +W(µ1 ∩ µ
opt
1 ) +W(µ2)
≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1W(µ
opt
1 \ µ1) +W(µ
opt
1 ∩ µ1) +W(µ
opt \ µ
opt
1 )
≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1W(µopt).
For ternary valuations in {0, 1,α}, the above algorithm gives a (1 + α)-approximation. An im-
proved approximation for ternary valuations can be achieved using the following modification:
When computing the stable integral matching, resolve ties in favour of the pairs (m,w) with
the highest U (m,w) + V (m,w). The next lemma establishes an improved approximatio ratio of
max{2,α}.
Lemma 2. The modified algorithm for SMC instances with ternary valuations in {0, 1,α} satisfies
W(µ1 \ µ
opt
1 ) ≥ min{
1
2 ,
1
α }W(µ
opt
1 \ µ1).
Proof. For a pair (m,w) of matching µ
opt
1 \ µ1, we use the term neighborhood to refer to the
pairs of µ1 \ µ
opt
1 that use agent m or w . We will show that the total utility from pairs in the
neighborhood of (m,w) is at least min{1, 2/α} (U (m,w) +V (m,w)). Since each pair of µ1 \µ
opt
1 can
be in the neighborhood of at most two pairs of µ
opt
1 \ µ1, this will give us the desired inequality.
Indeed, by the particular way we resolve ties in the ordinal preferences before computing the
matching µ1, a heavy pair (m,w) in µ
opt
1 \ µ1 must have a pair of utility at leastU (m,w)+V (m,w)
in its neighborhood. A light pair (m,w) hasU (m,w)+V (m,w) ≤ α and certainly has a heavy pair
of utility at least 2 in its neighborhood. 
The above discussion is summarized in the following statement.
Theorem 5. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given an SMC instance I with an opti-
mal matching µopt, computes a stable integral matching µ withW(µ) ≥ min{ 12 ,
1
α
}W(µopt) if I has
ternary valuations in {0, 1,α}, and W(µ) ≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1W(µopt) in general, where σmax and
σmin denote the highest and lowest non-zero valuation in I, respectively.
Weconclude this section by considering approximate stability. For general valuations, we present
a polynomial-time 1/ε-approximation algorithm for Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching,
which constructs an ε-stable fractional matching with a small support by combining an optimal
matching with a stable integral matching.
Theorem 6. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given any SMC instanceI = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉
and any rational ε ∈ [0, 1], computes a fractional matching µ that is ε-stable for I such thatW(µ) ≥
εW(µopt), where µopt is an optimal matching for I.
Proof. Let µs be any stable integral matching and µopt be an optimal matching for I. Note
that both µs and µopt can be computed in polynomial time. We will show that µ ≔ (1 − ε)µs +
εµopt satisfies the desired properties. Indeed, W(µ) = (1 − ε)W(µs) + εW(µopt) ≥ εW(µopt).
Furthermore, since µs is stable, we have that for any man-woman pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , either
um(µ
s) ≥ U (m,w) orvw (µs) ≥ V (m,w). The former condition implies thatum(µ) ≥ (1−ε)um(µs) ≥
(1− ε)U (m,w), while the latter condition gives vw (µ) ≥ (1− ε)V (m,w). Either way, the pair (m,w)
is ε-stable. 
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In particular, Theorem 6 shows that a 12 -stable fractional matching with welfare at least half of
that of an optimal fractional matching (and therefore, that of an optimal stable fractional matching)
can be computed in polynomial time. In Section A.4, we provide a slightly stronger welfare guar-
antee: There is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 12 -stable fractional matching with
welfare at least that of an optimal (exactly) stable fractional matching.
5 HARDNESS OF APPROXIMATION
In this section, we present our inapproximability statements, which are by far the technically
most involved results in the paper. We present polynomial-time reductions which, given a 3SAT
formula ϕ of a particular structure, construct SMC instances that simulate the evaluation of ϕ for
every variable assignment. The constructed SMC instances consist of several gadgets including an
accumulator. The simulation of the evaluation of ϕ by the SMC instance is such that:
(a) when ϕ has a satisfying assignment, there is a stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching where
the contribution of the agents in the accumulator gadget to the welfare can be large and
dominates the contribution from the remaining SMC instance and
(b) when ϕ is not satisfiable, the contribution of the accumulator and, subsequently, the total
welfare of any stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching is very small.
Hence, distinguishing between SMC instances with stable (or ε-stable) fractional matchings of
very high and very low welfare would allow us to decide 3SAT. We have two inapproximability
statements: Theorem 7 for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching and Theorem 8 for Optimal
ε-Stable Fractional Matching.
Theorem 7. For every constant δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal Stable Fractional
Matching for SMC instances with ternary valuations in {0, 1,α}to within a factor of (i) α − 1/2−δ
if α = O(n), and (ii) Ω(n1−δ ) otherwise.
Theorem 8. For any constants ε ∈ (0, 0.03] and δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal
ε-Stable Fractional Matching to within a factor of 1/ε − δ .
Wewill prove Theorem 7 here; the proof of Theorem 8, which uses similar gadgets but is slightly
more involved, appears in Appendix A.3. Since the proof is long, we have divided it into three parts:
the description of the reduction (Section 5.1), technical claims with gadget properties (Section 5.2),
and the proof of the inapproximability result (Section 5.3).
5.1 The reduction
In particular, we present a polynomial-time reduction from 2P2N-3SAT, the special case of 3SAT
consisting of 3-CNF clauses in which every variable appears four times: twice as a positive literal
and twice as a negative one. 2P2N-3SAT is known to be NP-hard [37]. Our reduction takes as input
an instance of 2P2N-3SAT consisting of N (boolean) variables x1, x2, ..., xN , and a 3-CNF formula
ϕ with L = 4N /3 clauses c1, c2, ..., cL . Without loss of generality, we assume that each clause in ϕ
consists of distinct literals.
Given the instance of 2P2N-3SAT, our reduction generates an instance I = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 of
Optimal Stable FractionalMatching. As usual, we denote by n the number of men (or women)
inI. Wewill use a positive integer parameter k whichwill determine the size ofn; in particular,n =
O(N +k). We define I by referring to its graph representation, which consists of variable gadgets,
clause gadgets, variable-clause connectors, an accumulator, and clause-accumulator connectors. For
each gadget, we classify the edges (i.e., man-woman pairs and their valuations) into the following
three types:
• man-heavy edges (m,w) with U (m,w) = α and V (m,w) = 0,
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• woman-heavy edges (m,w) with U (m,w) = 0 and V (m,w) = α , and
• balanced edges (m,w) with U (m,w) = V (m,w) = 1.
Recall that any pair (m,w) that does not appear as an edge in the graph representation hasU (m,w) =
V (m,w) = 0.
The instance I has a variable gadget for every variable x , which consists of five menmx1 , m
x
2 ,
ex1 , e
x
2 , e
x
3 , four women w
x
1 , w
x
2 , f
x
1 , f
x
2 and the ten balanced edges (e
x
1 , f
x
1 ), (m
x
1 , f
x
1 ), (m
x
1 ,w
x
1 ),
(ex3 ,w
x
1 ), (e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ), (m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ), (m
x
2 , f
x
2 ), (e
x
2 , f
x
2 ), (m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ), and (m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ), as shown in Figure 4a.
ex1
f x1
mx1 w
x
1
ex3 w
x
2
mx2
f x2
ex2
1
1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
(a)
ec2
ec1
wc3
wc2
wc1
mc wc
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
0 α
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) The variable gadget corresponding to the variable x . (b) The clause gadget corresponding
to the clause c and its CA-connector (mc ,wc ). As a convention, we use circles to represent men and
diamonds to represent women.
For every clause c , instance I has a clause gadget with three menmc , ec1 , e
c
2 , three women w
c
1 ,
wc2 , w
c
3 , and the nine balanced edges between them, as shown in Figure 4b.
For every appearance of a literal in a clause, there is a variable-clause connector (orVC-connector).
VC-connectors have different structure depending (1) on whether they correspond to positive or
negative literals, and (2) on the value of α . In each case, we identify one edge of the VC-connector
as the input, and either one or two edges as the output.
Specifically, for every positive literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal
(j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of clause c , I has a VC-connector defined as follows:
• Whenα ≥ 2, the VC-connector consists of a singlewoman-heavy edge betweenmxi (from the
variable gadget corresponding to variable x ) andwcj (from the clause gadget corresponding
to clause c), as shown in Figure 5a. This edge is simultaneously the input and the output
edge of the VC-connector.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), the VC-connector consists of womanwx,c , manmx,c , the woman-heavy
edges (mxi ,w
x,c ) and (mx,c ,wcj ), and the balanced edge (m
x,c ,wx,c), as shown in Figure 5b.
Here, (mxi ,w
x,c ) is the input and (mx,c ,wcj ) is the output edge.
For every negative literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of
clause c , I has a VC-connector defined as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, the VC-connector consists of man mx,c , woman wx,c , the man-heavy edge
(mx,c ,wxi ), the balanced edge (m
x,c ,wx,c ), and the woman-heavy edge (mx,c ,wcj ), as shown
in Figure 5c. Here, (mx,c ,wxi ) is the input and (m
x,c ,wcj ) is the output edge.
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• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), the VC-connector consists of three menmx,c1 ,m
x,c
2 ,m
x,c
3 , three women
wx,c1 , w
x,c
2 , w
x,c
3 , the man-heavy edges (m
x,c
1 ,w
x
i ), (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
1 ), (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
2 ), the woman-
heavy edges (mx,c1 ,w
x,c
2 ), (m
x,c
2 ,w
c
j ), (m
x,c
3 ,w
c
j ), and the balanced edges (m
x,c
1 ,w
x,c
1 ), (m
x,c
2 ,w
x,c
2 ),
(mx,c3 ,w
x,c
3 ), as shown in Figure 5d. In this case, theVC-connector has one input edge (m
x,c
1 ,w
x
i )
and two output edges (mx,c2 ,w
c
j ) and (m
x,c
3 ,w
c
j ).
mxi
wcj
0
α
(a)
mxi w
x,c mx,c w
c
j0 α 1 1 0 α
(b)
wxi m
x ,c wcj
wx ,c
0 α 0 α
1
1
(c)
wxi m
x ,c
1 w
x ,c
2 m
x ,c
3
wcj
wx ,c1 w
x ,c
3
mx ,c2
0 α 0 α 0 α 0 α
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
α
0
α
(d)
Fig. 5. VC-connectors corresponding to clause c and positive literal x for (a) α ≥ 2 and (b)α ∈ (3/2, 2),
and to clause c and negative literal x for (c) α ≥ 2 and (d) α ∈ (3/2, 2).
The accumulator (Figure 6) of instance I has different structure depending on the value of α .
Its size depends on the positive integer parameter k .
• When α ≥ 2 (see Figure 6a), the accumulator hasmanmi andwomanwi for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
men e1i and e
2
i and woman f
1
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, man e
3
i and women f
2
i and f
3
i for all
i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}, and womanwc for every clause c ofϕ. In addition, there are man-heavy edges
(mi ,wi−1) and (e3i , f
2
i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k} and (e
2
i ,wi ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1}, the balanced
edges (m1,wc ) for every clause c , which we call tine edges, (e1i ,wi ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}
and (mi , f 2i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}, and the woman-heavy edges (mi ,wi ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
(e1i , f
1
i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, and (mi , f
3
i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2) (see Figure 6b), the accumulator has manmi , woman wi for i = 1, ...,k ,
man e1i and woman f
1
i for i = 1, ...,k − 1, man e
2
i and woman f
2
i for i = 2, ...,k , and woman
wc for every clause c ofϕ. In addition, it contains theman-heavy edges (mi ,wi−1) and (e2i , f
2
i )
for i = 2, ...,k and (mi , f 2i−1) for i = 3, ...,k , the balanced edges (m1,w
c ) for every clause c
(tine edges), (e1i ,wi ) for i = 1, ...,k − 1 and (mi , f
2
i ) for i = 2, ...,k , and the woman-heavy
edges (mi ,wi ) for i = 1, ...,k , and (e1i , f
1
i ) and (e
1
i ,wi+1) for i = 1, ...,k − 1.
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wc1
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Fig. 6. The accumulator for the cases (a) α ≥ 2 and (b) α ∈ (3/2, 2).
Finally, instance I has a clause-accumulator connector (or CA-connector) for every clause c of ϕ
consisting of the woman-heavy edge (mc ,wc ) between the manmc (from the clause gadget corre-
sponding to clause c) and womanwc (from the accumulator); see Figure 4b. Notice that the above
construction has more women than men. To restore balance, we pad the instance with extra (iso-
lated) men that neither value nor are valued by any other agent. This completes the construction
of the reduced instance.
5.2 Gadget properties
We will now prove several important properties (Claims 9-12) of our construction.
Claim 9. For every variable x , a stable fractional matching µ satisfies at least one of the following:
(1) µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
1 , f
x
1 ) = 1 and µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = 1.
(2) µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
1 ) = 1 and µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) = 1.
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Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}, we have µ(mxi ,w
x
1 )+ µ(m
x
i ,w
x
2 )+
µ(mxi , f
x
1 ) < 1 and µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
j )+ µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
j ) + µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
j ) < 1. Then, bothm
x
i andw
x
j will have utility
strictly less than 1 under µ , and thus the pair (mxi ,w
x
j ) would be blocking. 
We remark that the two conditions in the statement of Claim 9 affect the weight of the in-
put edges of the VC-connectors that are attached to the variable gadget in any stable fractional
matching. In particular, condition (1) implies that the weight assigned to the input edges of the
VC-connectors that correspond to the two appearances of the positive literal x in clauses must
be 0. To see why, observe that these input edges are incident to nodesmx1 and m
x
2 , and the total
weight of all edges incident to each of these nodes cannot exceed 1. Condition (2) has a similar
implication for the edges associated with the negative literal x .
Claim 10. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to the input edge of a VC-
connector must assign a weight of 0 to its output edge(s) as well.
Proof. For α ≥ 2, the claim holds trivially for VC-connectors corresponding to positive literals
(Figure 5a). Consider a VC-connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c con-
taining it (Figure 5c). Observe that, besides the input edge (mx,c ,wxi ), the edge (m
x,c ,wx,c ) is the
only balanced or man-heavy edge that is incident to manmx,c and the only balanced (or woman-
heavy) edge incident to woman wx,c . Hence, stability of the edge (mx,c ,wx,c ) requires a weight
of 1 assigned to it when the weight assigned to input edge (mx,c ,wxi ) is 0. Then, the output edge
(mx,c ,wcj ), which is also incident to the nodem
x,c , must have a weight of 0 as well.
We now consider the caseα ∈ (3/2, 2). First consider a VC-connector corresponding to a positive
literal x and a clause c containing it (Figure 5b). The edge (mx,c ,wx,c) is the only balanced or man-
heavy edge that is incident to manmx,c and, besides the input edge (mxi ,w
x,c), the only balanced
(or woman-heavy) edge incident to woman wx,c . Hence, stability of edge (mx,c ,wx,c) requires a
weight of 1 assigned to it when the weight assigned to edge (mxi ,w
x,c) is 0. Then, the output edge
(mx,c ,wcj ), which is also incident to nodem
x,c , must have a weight of 0 as well.
Finally, consider a VC-connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c containing
it (Figure 5d). Observe that (mx,c1 ,w
x,c
1 ) is the only balanced or woman-heavy edge that is incident
to woman wx,c1 and, besides the input edge (m
x,c
1 ,w
x
i ), the only balanced or man-heavy edge in-
cident to manmx,c1 . Also, (m
x,c
2 ,w
x,c
2 ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge that is incident to
manmx,c2 and, besides edge (m
x,c
1 ,w
x,c
2 ), the only balanced or woman-heavy edge to womanw
x,c
2 .
Furthermore, (mx,c3 ,w
x,c
3 ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge that is incident to womanw
x,c
3
and, besides edges (mx,c3 ,w
x,c
1 ) and (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
2 ), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to
manmx,c3 .
Hence, stability of edge (mx,c1 ,w
x,c
1 ) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it when the weight as-
signed to edge (mx,c1 ,w
x
i ) is 0. Then, edges (m
x,c
1 ,w
x,c
2 ) and (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
1 ) must have a weight of 0.
Then, stability of edge (mx,c2 ,w
x,c
2 ) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it and the edge (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
2 )
and the output edge (mx,c2 ,w
c
j ) must have a weight of 0. Then, stability of edge (m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
3 ) re-
quires a weight of 1 assigned to it. Hence, the output edge (mx,c3 ,w
c
j ) must have a weight of 0 as
well. 
Claim 11. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to all output edges of the
VC-connectors of clause c must assign a weight of 0 to the CA-connector of clause c as well.
Proof. Let ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 be the literals of clause c . Consider, for the sake of contradiction, a
stable fractional matching that assigns (1) a weight of 0 to all output edges of the VC-connectors
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corresponding to literals ℓi and clause c and (2) strictly positive weight to edge (mc ,wc ) of the CA-
connector for clause c . Note that condition (2) implies that the total weight on the edges (mc ,wc1 ),
(mc ,wc2 ) and (m
c ,wc3 ) is strictly smaller than 1. Since these are the only balanced or man-heavy
edges incident to manmc , the stability of these edges is guaranteed by a utility of (at least) 1 for
each of the agents wc1 , w
c
2 , and w
c
3 . By condition (1) and since, besides the output edges of the
VC-connectors, the edges (ec1 ,w
c
i ), (e
c
2 ,w
c
i ), and (m
c ,wci ) are the only balanced or woman-heavy
edges incident to agent wci for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the weight assigned to these three edges is at least 1.
Hence, the total weight on the nine edges of the clause gadget is at least 3, i.e., strictly more than
2 for the six edges incident to men ec1 and e
c
2 , violating the definition of a fractional matching. 
Claim 12. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to some CA-connector must
assign a total weight of 1 to the tine edges and a weight of 1 to every balanced edge of the accumulator.
Proof. Assume that a weight of 0 has been assigned to the edge (mc
′
,wc
′
) of the CA-connector
corresponding to some clause c ′. Since this is the only woman-heavy edge that is incident to agent
wc
′
and there is no man-heavy edge incident to agentm1, stability on the edge (m1,wc
′
) requires
that the total weight of the tine edges (m1,wc ) (for every clause c) is (at least) 1. Hence, the weight
of the edge (m1,w1) is 0. We will complete the proof by distinguishing between the two different
accumulator structures, depending on whether α ≥ 2 or α ∈ (3/2, 2).
When α ≥ 2, it suffices to show that for i = 1, ...,k − 1, if the weight of edge (mi ,wi ) is 0, then
the weight of the balanced edges (e1i ,wi ) and (mi+1, f
2
i+1) is 1 and the weight of edge (mi+1,wi+1)
is 0. Indeed, observe that, edge (e1i ,wi ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man e
1
i
and, besides edge (mi ,wi ), the only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to womanwi . Hence,
the balanced edge (e1i ,wi ) must have a weight of 1 and the edge (mi+1,wi ) a weight of 0.
Then, edge (mi+1, f 2i+1) is the only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to woman f
2
i+1 and,
besides edge (mi+1,wi ), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to manmi+1. Hence, the
balanced edge (mi+1, f 2i+1) must have a weight of 1 and the edge (mi+1,wi+1) a weight of 0.
When α ∈ (3/2, 2), it suffices to show that for i = 1, ...,k − 1, if the weight of edge (mi ,wi ) and
(if they exist) edges (e1i−1,wi ) and (mi+1, f
2
i ) is 0, then the weight of the balanced edges (e
1
i ,wi )
and (mi+1, f 2i+1) is 1 and the weight of edges (mi+1,wi+1), (e
1
i ,wi+1), and (if it exists) (mi+2, f
2
i+1)
is 0. Indeed, observe that, edge (e1i ,wi ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man
e1i and, besides edge (mi ,wi ) and (if it exists) (e
1
i−1,wi ), the only balanced or woman-heavy edge
incident to woman wi . Hence, the balanced edge (e1i ,wi ) must have a weight of 1 and the edges
(mi+1,wi ) and (if it exists) (e1i ,wi+1) a weight of 0. Then, the edge (mi+1, f
2
i+1) is, besides (mi+1, f
2
i )
and (mi+1,wi ), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to manmi+1 and the only balanced
or woman-heavy edge incident to woman f 2i+1. Hence, the balanced edge (mi+1, f
2
i+1) must have a
weight of 1 and the edges (mi+1,wi+1) and (if it exists) (mi+2, f 2i+1) a weight of 0. 
5.3 Proof of inapproximability
Lemma 3. If formula ϕ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I has welfare at
most 80αN + 4(k − 1).
Proof. We will first show that if ϕ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I
assigns weight 0 to some CA-connector. For the sake of contradiction, consider a stable fractional
matching that assigns a strictly positive weight to all CA-connectors. We will construct a truth
assignment for the formula ϕ (contradicting the assumption of the lemma) by repeating the fol-
lowing process for every clause c of ϕ: Let ℓ be a literal that appears in c such that the output
edge(s) of the VC-connector, that corresponds to the appearance of ℓ in c , have strictly positive
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total weight. By Claim 11, such a literal must exist. We set ℓ to 1 (true). For every variable that has
not received a value in this way, we arbitrarily set it to 1.
The above assignment satisfies all the clauses. To show that it is also valid, we need to argue that
there is no variable x such that both literals x and x have been set to 1. Assume, to the contrary, that
literal x is set to 1 due to its appearance in a clause c1, and literal x is set to 1 due to its appearance
in a different clause c2. Thus, in the above assignment, the output edge(s) of the VC-connector
between the literal x and the clause c1, as well as the VC-connector between the literal x and the
clause c2 have strictly positive (total) weight. By Claim 10, the input edges of both VC-connectors
also have strictly positive weight. Let i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2} be such that the i1-th appearance of x is in
the clause c1 and the i2-th appearance of x is in the clause c2. Therefore, the said input edges are
incident to the nodesmxi1 andw
x
i2
. Using Claim 9, we get that the total weight on the edges incident
to one ofmxi1 orw
x
i2
exceeds 1, contradicting feasibility. Thus, the above assignment must be valid,
which, in turn, implies that any stable fractional matching assigns weight 0 to some CA-connector.
By Claim 12, the contribution of the accumulator to the welfare is exactly 4k−2 (2 from the tine
edges plus 2 from each balanced edge). Let us now consider the contribution of the edges that do
not belong to the accumulator. This comprises of
• a total value of 20 for the ten balanced edges of each of the N variable gadgets,
• a total value of α (respectively, 2 + 2α ) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corre-
sponding to a positive literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)),
• a total value of 2 + 2α (respectively, 6 + 6α ) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors
corresponding to a negative literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)),
• a total value of 18 + α for the nine balanced edges of each of the 4N /3 clause gadgets and
their corresponding CA-connectors.
It can be easily seen that 80αN −2 is a (loose) upper bound on the total value from these edges. 
Lemma 4. If ϕ is satisfiable, then there exists a stable fractional matching of I with welfare at least
4(k − 1)(α − 1/2).
Proof. Starting from a satisfying assignment for ϕ, we will construct a stable fractional match-
ing µ in which the welfare of the accumulator gadget is at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2).
Variable gadgets. For the edges of the variable gadget of the variable x , µ is defined as:
• If x is true, then µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) = µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) = 1/2, µ(e
x
1 , f
x
1 ) =
µ(ex2 , f
x
2 ) = 1, and the remaining edges have weight 0.
• If x is false, then µ(ex3 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) = 1/2, µ(m
x
1 , f
x
1 ) = µ(m
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = 1, and the remaining
edges have weight 0.
Clause gadgets and CA-connectors. For each clause, select one of the true literals (tie-break arbi-
trarily) and call it active. Note that each clause has an active literal in a satisfying assignment. Con-
sider the clause c , and let ℓi be its active literal for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Also, let i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i}
denote the other two indices. Set µ(ec1 ,w
c
i1
) = µ(ec2 ,w
c
i2
) = 1, and set the weight of the remaining
balanced edges to 0. Assign a weight of 1 to the CA-connector, i.e., µ(mc ,wc ) = 1.
VC-connectors. For every non-active VC-connector, set the weight of its balanced edges (if any)
to 1 and the weight of the remaining edges to 0. For every active VC-connector corresponding to
the i-th appearance of the positive literal x as the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}),
the weights of its edges are as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mxi ,w
c
j ) = 1/2.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(mxi ,w
x,c) = 1/2, µ(mx,c ,wx,c ) = 1−α/2, and µ(mx,c,wcj ) = 1/α .
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For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance of the negative literal x as
the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), the weights of its edges are as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mx,c ,wxi ) = µ(m
x,c ,wcj ) = 1/2 and µ(m
x,c ,wx,c ) = 0.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(mx,c1 ,w
x
i ) = 1/2, µ(m
x,c
1 ,w
x,c
1 ) = 1 − α/2, µ(m
x,c
1 ,w
x,c
2 ) =
(α − 1)/2, µ(mx,c2 ,w
x,c
2 ) = 1 − (α
2 − α)/2, µ(mx,c2 ,w
c
j ) = 2/α − 1, µ(m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
1 ) = 1/α ,
µ(mx,c3 ,w
x,c
2 ) = µ(m
x,c
3 ,w
x,c
3 ) = 0, µ(m
x,c
3 ,w
c
j ) = 1 − 1/α .
Accumulator. We set µ(m1,wc ) = 0 for every tine edge (m1,wc ) of the accumulator. Furthermore:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mi ,wi ) = 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, µ(e2i ,wi ) = 1 − 2/α , µ(mi+1,wi ) =
1/α , µ(e1i , f
1
i ) = 1, µ(e
1
i ,wi ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, µ(mi , f
2
i ) = 0, µ(mi , f
3
i ) = 1 − 2/α ,
and µ(e3i , f
2
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}. Among these, any edge with a positive weight is
either man- or woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times its
weight. It can be verified that the total contribution is 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) + 1.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(m1,w1) = 1/α , µ(m2,w2) = α + 1/α − 2, µ(mi ,wi ) = 1 − 1/α
for all i ∈ {3, . . . ,k}, µ(mi+1,wi ) = 1 − 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, µ(e1i ,wi ) = 0 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, µ(m2, f 22 ) = 2 − α , µ(mi , f
2
i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {3, . . . ,k}, µ(e
1
1, f
1
1 ) =
α − 1, µ(e22, f
2
2 ) = α − 2/α , µ(e
2
k
, f 2
k
) = 1, µ(e1i , f
1
i ) = 2 − 2/α for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k − 1},
µ(e2i , f
2
i ) = 2 − 2/α for all i ∈ {3, . . . ,k − 1}, µ(e
1
1,w2) = 2 − α , µ(e
1
i ,wi+1) = 2/α − 1 for all
i ∈ {2, . . . ,k−1}, and µ(mi+1, f 2i ) = 2/α −1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k−1}. Except for the balanced
edge (m2, f 22 ), every edge with a positive weight among the ones listed above is either man-
or woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times its weight. It
can be verified that the total contribution in this case is 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) + 2α2 − 7α + 7.
In each case, the accumulator contributes at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) to the social welfare, as desired.
The feasibility of µ can be verified by inspection. To see why µ is stable, note that we only need
to check for the balanced edges, as theman- or woman-heavy edges and the remaining pairs do not
impose any constraints on stability. For the balanced edges, stability is established by the following
series of observations (we will use the term ‘stabilized by’ to denote that an agent’s utility is at
least 1): The variable gadget for the variable x (Figure 4a) is stabilized by the agents f x1 , f
x
2 , e
x
3
along withmx1 ,m
x
2 (if x is true) orw
x
1 , w
x
2 (if x is false). The clause gadget for clause c (Figure 4b)
with active index i (and non-active indices i1 and i2) is stabilized by the agents ec1 , e
c
2 ,w
c
i ,w
c
i1
,wci2 ; in
particular, the edge (mc ,wci ) is stabilized byw
c
i because an active literal triggers the woman-heavy
edge in the VC-connector. A VC connector is stabilized by wx,c (Figure 5b), mx,c (Figure 5c), or
mx,c1 ,w
x,c
2 , andm
x,c
3 (Figure 5d). Finally, the tine edges in the accumulator (Figure 6) are stabilized
by wc1 , . . . ,wcL (because we trigger the CA-connector), and the remaining balanced edges are
stabilized bywi ’s andmi ’s except form1. Overall, µ is a feasible stable fractional matching. 
We are ready to prove Theorem 7. If α < N 1+1/δ , we use our construction with any k satisfying
k −1 ≥ 20αN (α−1/2−δ )
δ
. It is easy to verify that the reduction is polynomial-time. Furthermore, from
Lemma 3, we know that the welfare of µ when ϕ is not satisfiable is at most
80αN + 4(k − 1) ≤
4(k − 1)δ
α − 1/2 − δ
+ 4(k − 1) =
4(k − 1)(α − 1/2)
α − 1/2 − δ
.
This number is at leastα−1/2−δ times smaller than thewelfare of µ whenϕ is satisfiable (Lemma 4).
This establishes the inapproximability bound in part (i) of Theorem 7.
Ifα ≥ N 1+1/δ , we use our constructionwith k = N 1+1/δ . Once again, the reduction is polynomial-
time, and the instance I has n = Θ(N 1+1/δ ) men and women. Observe that α = Ω(n), k = Θ(n),
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and N = O(nδ ). Hence, the welfare of µ when ϕ is not satisfiable is at most
80αN + 4(k − 1) ≤ 80αN + 4N 1+1/δ ≤ 84αN = O(αnδ ).
On the other hand, the welfare of µ when ϕ is satisfiable is at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2), i.e., Ω(αn).
This establishes the bound in part (ii), and with it, completes the proof of Theorem 7.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We will use the SMC instance shown in Figure 7, where, for some k (to be determined
later), we have manmi and womanwi for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, men e1i and e
2
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1},
woman f 1i for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k − 1}, man e
3
i and women f
2
i and f
3
i for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}. The
valuations of the agents are as shown in Figure 7. We note that the instance shown in Figure 7 is
a slight modification of the accumulator gadget used in the proof of Theorem 7 (see Figure 6a).
Consider a stable integral matching µs . By the stability requirement for the pair (e11 ,w1), µ
s
should contain either the pair (m1,w1) or the pair (e11,w1). Either of these pairs contribute at most
α to the social welfare (recall thatα ≥ 2). Once again, the stability requirement for the pairs (mi , f 2i )
for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k} and (e1i ,wi ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k − 1} will force these pairs to be contained in
µ as well. Each of these pairs contributes 2 to the social welfare, and thus,W(µs ) ≤ 4k − 6 + α .
Define a stable fractional matching µ as follows: We set µ(mi ,wi ) = 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
µ(e2i ,wi ) = 1 − 2/α , µ(mi+1,wi ) = 1/α , µ(e
1
i ,wi ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, µ(mi , f
2
i ) = 0,
µ(mi , f
3
i ) = 1 − 2/α , µ(e
3
i , f
2
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k}, and µ(e
1
i , f
1
i ) = 1, for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,k − 1}
(note that we use a similar matching in the proof of Lemma 4). It can be easily seen that the social
welfare of µ isW(µ) = 4k(α−1/2)−5α+3. It is also not hard to check that µ is stable. The theorem
follows by setting k to be sufficiently large. 
m1 w1 m2
e21 f
3
2
e11
e32
f 22
w2
e22
e12
f 12
mk wk
e3
k
f 2
k
f 3
k
0 α 0 α
0
α
0
α
0 α
1
1
0
α
1
1
0 . . . α
0
α
1
1
0
α
0 α
0
α
1
1
0
α
Fig. 7. The SMC instance used in the proof of Theorem 1.
A.2 The case of symmetric valuations
Asmentioned in Section 1, a result by Deligkas et al. [9] on greedy weighted matchings in bipartite
graphs implies the NP-hardness of the problem of computing the optimal stable integral matching
on SMC instances. In particular, the interpretation of the result of [9] in our model involves SMC
instances I = 〈M ,W ,U ,V 〉 with ternary valuations in {0, 1,α} with α ∈ (1, 2), which are symmet-
ric, i.e.,U = V . Our next lemma shows that, for these SMC instances, the optimal stable fractional
matching is –without loss of generality– integral and the result in [9] implies the NP-hardness of
Optimal Stable Fractional Matching.
Lemma 5. Let I be an SMC instance with symmetric and ternary valuations, and let µ∗ be an
optimal stable fractional matching for I. Then, there exists a stable integral matching µs such that
W(µs) =W(µ∗).
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Proof. Consider an optimal stable fractional matching µ∗ that is non-integral (i.e., has support
of size at least two), and let µ be an integral matching in a support of µ∗. We will show that µ is
a stable integral matching. In this way, we will have that all matchings in the support of µ∗ are
optimal stable integral matchings.
Assume otherwise that µ is not stable, and let (m,w) be a blocking pair in µ with U (m,w) =
V (m,w) = 1. This means that either µ contains no pair involving agentsm andw , or any such pair
(m′,w ′)with eitherm′ =m orw ′ = w satisfiesU (m′,w ′) = V (m′,w ′) = 0. Then, by replacing such
pairs with (m,w) in µ (and, subsequently, in the support of µ∗), we get a stable fractional matching
of even higher welfare than µ∗ contradicting its optimality.
Now assume that (m,w) is a blocking pair in µ with U (m,w) = V (m,w) = α . This means that
either µ has no pair that contains agents m and w , or any such pair (m′,w ′) with m′ = m and
w ′ = w satisfies U (m′,w ′) = V (m′,w ′) = 1. But then, since µ participates in the support of µ∗ (i.e.,
with strictly positive weight) and no valuation is higher than α in I, the utility of both agentsm
andw in µ∗ will be strictly smaller than α , contradicting its stability. 
By Lemma 5 and the results in [9], we immediately have the following.
Corollary 1. Optimal Stable Fractional Matching is NP-hard.
A.3 Hardness for ε-stability
The proof of Theorem 8 follows along similar lines to the proof of Theorem 7. Again, we present
a reduction from 2P2N-3SAT but now we begin by augmenting the instance in the following way.
For each variable of the original instance, we create a clone-variable and for each clause of the
original instance we create a clone-clause that contains the clone-variables corresponding to the
variables of the initial clause. Each variable and its clone are coupled variables and, similarly, each
clause and its clone are coupled clauses.
Let the modified input consist of N (boolean) variables x1, x2, ..., xN , and a 3-CNF formula ϕ
with 4N /3 clauses c1, c2, ..., c4N /3. Note that if ϕ is not satisfiable, then there exist at least two
clauses that are not satisfied.
A.3.1 The reduction. InstanceI again consists of variable gadgets, clause gadgets, VC-connectors,
an accumulator, and CA-connectors.
In particular, instance I contains a variable gadget (Figure 4a) for every variable x , and a clause
gadget for every clause c as in the proof of Theorem 7 (see Figure 4b). The VC-connectors are as
those in the proof of Theorem 7 for the case α ≥ 2 (see Figures 5a and 5c), while the accumulator,
apart from the balanced tine edges (m1,wc ) for every clause c , now contains just a single edge
(m1,w1) such thatU (m1,w1) = 0 and V (m1,w1) = β , where the value of β will be set later. Finally,
each CA-connector (mc ,wc ) corresponding to clause c , is modified so that U (mc ,wc ) = 0 and
V (mc ,wc ) = 1. All other woman-heavy, man-heavy, and balanced edges not explicitly mentioned
above are as in the proof of Theorem 7. We set α = 2(1 − ε) for the value used in man-heavy and
woman-heavy edges, and observe that, when ε < 0.03, it holds (3α2 + 4)ε < 1/2.
A.3.2 Gadget properties. We have completed the description of the reduction. We are ready to
prove important properties of the several gadgets; these follow as Claims 13-16.
Claim 13. For every variable x , an ε-stable fractional matching µ satisfies at least one of the fol-
lowing conditions:
(1) µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
1 , f
x
1 ) ≥ 1 − ε and µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
2 , f
x
2 ) ≥ 1 − ε .
(2) µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) + µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
1 ) ≥ 1 − ε and µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) + µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) ≥ 1 − ε .
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Proof. Assume otherwise that µ(mxi ,w
x
1 ) + µ(m
x
i ,w
x
2 ) + µ(m
x
i , f
x
1 ) < 1 − ε and µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
j ) +
µ(mx2 ,w
x
j )+ µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
j ) < 1− ε for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Then, since instance I contains no man-heavy edge
(mxi ,w) and no woman-heavy edge (m,w
x
j ), the pair (m
x
i ,w
x
j ) is ε-blocking; a contradiction. 
As before, the two conditions in the statement of Claim 13 affect the weight of the input edges
of the VC-connectors that are attached to the variable gadget in any ε-stable fractional matching.
So, condition (1) implies that the weight assigned to each input edge of the VC-connectors that
correspond to the two appearances of the positive literal x in clauses must be at most ε . To see why,
observe that these input edges are incident to nodesmx1 andm
x
2 , and the total weight of all edges
incident to each of these nodes cannot exceed 1. Similarly, condition (2) implies that the weight
assigned to each input edge of the VC-connectors that correspond to the two appearances of the
negative literal x in clauses must be at most ε .
Claim 14. Any ε-stable fractional matching, that assigns a weight of at most ε to the input edge
of a VC-connector, must assign a weight of at most αε to its output edge as well.
Proof. The claim holds trivially for VC-connectors corresponding to positive literals. Consider
a VC-connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c containing it. Observe that,
besides the input edge (mx,c ,wxi ), the edge (m
x,c ,wx,c ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge
that is incident to man mx,c and the only balanced (or woman-heavy) edge incident to woman
wx,c . Hence, ε-stability of edge (mx,c ,wx,c ) requires a weight of at least 1 − ε − αζ assigned to it
when the weight assigned to edge (mx,c ,wxi ) is ζ ≤ ε . Then, the output edge, which is also incident
to nodemx,c , must have a weight of at most ε + (α − 1)ζ ≤ αε . 
Claim 15. Any ε-stable fractional matching, that assigns a weight of at most αε to each output
edge of the VC-connectors corresponding to clause c , must assign a weight of at most 3(α2 + 1)ε to the
CA-connector of clause c as well.
Proof. Let ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 be the literals of clause c . Consider (for the sake of contradiction) an
ε-stable fractional matching µ that assigns (1) a weight of at most αε to each output edge of the
VC-connectors corresponding to literals ℓi and clause c and (2) a weight of more than 3(α2 + 1)ε
to edge (mc ,wc ) of the CA-connector for clause c . Note that condition (2) implies that the total
weight on the edges (mc ,wc1 ), (m
c ,wc2 ) and (m
c ,wc3 ) is strictly smaller than 1 − 3(α
2
+ 1)ε . Since
these are the only balanced or man-heavy edges incident to manmc , the ε-stability of these edges
is guaranteed by a utility of (at least) 1 − ε for each of the agentswc1 ,w
c
2 , andw
c
3 .
By condition (1) and since, besides the output edges of the VC-connectors, the edges (ec1 ,w
c
i ),
(ec2 ,w
c
i ), and (m
c ,wci ) are the only balanced or woman-heavy edges incident to agent w
c
i for i ∈
{1, 2, 3}, the weight assigned to these three edges is at least 1 − (α2 + 1)ε . Hence, the total weight
on the nine edges of the clause gadget is at least 3− 3(α2 + 1)ε , i.e., strictly more than 2 for the six
edges incident to men ec1 and e
c
2 , violating the definition of a fractional matching. 
Claim 16. Any ε-stable fractional matching, that assigns a weight of at most 3(α2 + 1)ε to at least
two CA-connectors, must assign a total weight of 1 − ε to the tine edges and a weight of at most ε to
the single edge of the accumulator.
Proof. Assume that a weight of at most 3(α2+1)ε has been assigned to the edges (mc1,wc1) and
(mc2,wc2) of the CA-connectors corresponding to some clauses c1 and c2. Since these are the only
edges for which agentswc1 andwc2 have positive value, and there is no man-heavy edge incident
to agentm1, stability on the edges (m1,wc1) and (m1,wc2) requires that the total weight of the tine
edges (m1,wc ) (for every clause c) is (at least) 1− ε . Indeed, since (3α2+ 4)ε < 1/2 it is not possible
to guarantee stability of the edges (m1,wc1) and (m1,wc2) by assigning weight at least 1−(3α2+4)ε
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to each of them so that bothwc1 andwc2 have utility at least 1 − ε . Hence, the weight of the edge
(m1,w1) of the accumulator is at most ε . 
A.3.3 Proof of inapproximability.
Lemma 6. If formula ϕ is not satisfiable, then any ε-stable fractional matching of I has welfare at
most 56αN + βε .
Proof. We first show that, if ϕ is not satisfiable, then any ε-stable fractional matching of I
assigns weight at most 3(α2 + 1)ε to at least two CA-connectors. For the sake of contradiction,
consider an ε-stable fractional matching that assigns weight at most 3(α2 + 1)ε to at most one CA-
connector; let c be the relevant clause, if such a clause exists. We will construct a truth assignment
for formula ϕ (contradicting the assumption of the lemma) by repeating the following process for
every clause c ′ , c of ϕ. Let ℓ be a literal that appears in c ′ such that the output edge of the VC-
connector, that corresponds to the appearance of ℓ in c , has weight greater than αε . Recall that
such a literal certainly exists by Claim 15. We set ℓ to 1 (true). For every variable that has not
received a value in this way, we arbitrarily set it to 1.
The above assignment satisfies all clauses except possible for clause c . Since clause c is coupled
with another clause c ′ that is satisfied, it suffices to assign one of the variables appearing in c the
same value as its corresponding coupled variable appearing in c ′. To show that it is also valid,
we need to argue that there is no variable x such that both literals x and x have been set to 1.
Assume otherwise that this is the case. Furthermore, assume that literal x was set to 1 due to its
appearance in a clause c1, and that this is its i1-th appearance (with i1 ∈ {1, 2}). Also, literal x was
set to 1 due to its appearance in a different clause c2, where x makes its i2-th appearance (again,
i2 ∈ {1, 2}). Hence, the output edge of the VC-connector that corresponds to literal x and clause c1
(respectively, the VC-connector that corresponds to literal x and clause c2) has weight greater than
αε . Then, by Claim 14, the input edges of both VC-connectors have weight greater than ε . As these
input edges are incident to nodesmxi1 and w
x
i2
, Claim 13 yields that the total weight in the edges
incident to some of the nodesmxi1 andw
x
i2
is strictly higher than 1, contradicting the definition of
a fractional matching.
Since any ε-stable fractional matching assigns a weight of at most 3(α2 + 1)ε to at least two CA-
connectors, by Claim 16, the contribution of the accumulator to the welfare is at most 2(1− ε)+ βε
(2(1−ε) from the tine edges plus βε from the accumulator). The upper bound follows by considering
the sum of valuations of all agents for edges that do not belong to the accumulator. This sum
consists of
• total value of 20 for the ten balanced edges of each of the N variable gadgets,
• total value of α for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a positive
literal,
• total value of 2 + 2α for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a
negative literal,
• total value of 19 for the nine balanced edges of each of the 4N /3 clause gadgets and their
corresponding CA-connectors.
It can be easily seen that 56αN − 2(1 − ε) is a (loose) upper bound on the total value from these
edges. 
Lemma 7. If ϕ is satisfiable, then there exists an ε-stable fractional matching on I that has welfare
at least β .
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Proof. Consider an assignment of boolean values to the variables that satisfies ϕ. We construct
an ε-stable fractional matching µ in I so that the contribution of the accumulator gadget to the
welfare is at least β .
Variable gadgets. The weights on the edges of the variable gadget corresponding to variable x
are:
• µ(mx1 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) = µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) = 1/2, µ(e
x
1 , f
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = 1, and
µ(mx1 , f
x
1 ) = µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
2 ) = µ(m
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) = 0 if x is true, and
• µ(ex3 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
3 ,w
x
2 ) = 1/2, µ(m
x
1 , f
x
1 ) = µ(m
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = 1, µ(m
x
1 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
2 ) =
µ(mx1 ,w
x
2 ) = µ(m
x
2 ,w
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
1 , f
x
1 ) = µ(e
x
2 , f
x
2 ) = 0 if x is false.
Clause gadgets and CA-connectors. For every clause we select arbitrarily one of the true literals
of the clause and call it active; since the assignment satisfies ϕ, there is certainly such a literal.
Consider clause c and let ℓi (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) be its active literal; let i1 and i2 be the indices from
{1, 2, 3} than are different than i . We set µ(ec1 ,w
c
i1
) = µ(ec2 ,w
c
i2
) = 1 and µ(ec1 ,w
c
i ) = µ(e
c
1 ,w
c
i2
) =
µ(ec2 ,w
c
i ) = µ(e
c
2 ,w
c
i1
) = µ(mc ,wci ) = µ(m
c ,wci1) = µ(m
c ,wci2) = 0. We also assign a weight of 1 to
the CA-connector corresponding to c , i.e., µ(mc ,wc ) = 1.
VC-connectors. For every non-active VC-connector, we set the weight of its balanced edge (if
it exists) to 1 and the weight of the remaining edges to 0. For every active VC-connector corre-
sponding to the i-th appearance of the positive literal x as the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2},
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), we set µ(mxi ,w
c
j ) = 1/2.
For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance of the negative literal x
as the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), we set the weights of its edges as follows:
µ(mx,c ,wxi ) = µ(m
x,c ,wcj ) = 1/2 and µ(m
x,c ,wx,c ) = 0.
Accumulator. We set µ(m1,wc ) = 0 for every tine edge (m1,wc ) of the accumulator. Furthermore,
we set µ(m1,w1) = 1. So, the contribution of the accumulator to the social welfare is β , as desired.
It can be easily verified that the total weight of the edges that are incident to any node is at most
1. Hence, µ is a valid fractional matching. Regarding stability, it suffices to verify that either the
man or the woman of a balanced pair has a utility of at least 1 − ε . 
We are ready to prove Theorem 8. We select a value of β such that β ≥ 56αN1/ε−ε−δ . By Lemma 6,
the welfare of µ if ϕ was not satisfiable would be at most
56αN + βε ≤ β(1/ε − ε − δ ) + βε = β(1/ε − δ ).
By Lemma 7, we have that the welfare of µ if ϕ was not satisfiable would be at least 1/ε − δ times
smaller than the welfare I could have if ϕ was satisfiable.
A.4 Approximation Algorithm for 12 -stability
We will now provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 12 -stable fractional matching
with welfare at least that of an optimal (exactly) stable fractional matching. Notice that unlike The-
orems 5 and 6, where the quality of the computed matching is compared to the optimal matching
µopt, the guarantee in Theorem 17 is considerably weaker.
Theorem 17. Let I be an SMC instance and µ∗ be an optimal stable fractional matching for I.
Then, a 12 -stable fractional matching µ that satisfiesW(µ) ≥ W(µ
∗) can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. Consider the mixed integer linear program (OPT-Stab) from Section 2.1 for finding an
optimal stable fractional matching for I. Relaxing the integrality constraint (8) to y(m,w) ∈ [0, 1]
Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, and Rohit Vaish 27
results in a linear program. Since a stable fractional matching always exists (see Proposition 1),
this relaxation is feasible. Let µ be a solution of the relaxed program. Since max{y(m,w), 1 −
y(m,w)} ≥ 12 , we have that for every man-woman pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , either um ≥
1
2U (m,w) or
vw ≥
1
2V (m,w), implying that µ is
1
2 -stable. It is also clear that W(µ) ≥ W(µ
∗) since µ∗ satisfies
(OPT-Stab). 
